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Halcyon Freight GroupDEMO

Cloud Security

Azure posture, resource inventory, internet exposure, attack paths, data protection, workloads and permissions. As at 31 Oct 2026 · compared with 30 Sept 2026

DEMO data. Synthetic Azure estate; subscription and resource IDs are fictional.
Evidence-backedPartial evidenceAssessor-reportedNot assessed

Azure security posture

Defender for Cloud recommendations, Azure Secure Score and regulatory compliance — recommendation counts are not resource or vulnerability counts

Azure Secure Score · six assessments
Teal: Azure Secure Score (DS-02). Grey dashed: Microsoft 365 Secure Score — shown for contrast only, a different score.
Cloud security control categories
MCSB categoryOpen recsResourcesFailing controls
Data protection003
Network security696
Privileged access275
Posture and vulnerability management243
Endpoint security111
Logging and threat detection154
Affected subscriptions
SubscriptionOpen recsCriticalResources
sub-prod-coreProd204
sub-prod-integrationProd604
sub-prod-dataProd415
sub-prod-sharedProd304
sub-nonprod-devNon-prod716
Recommendation register12 of 16
IDRecommendationLevelResourcesSubscriptionCategorySourceStatusOwnerRisk
Management ports should be closed on your virtual machinesCritical1sub-nonprod-devNetwork securityDS-10UnhealthyMarcus BellUnlinked
SQL server firewall should not allow all IP addressesCritical1sub-prod-dataNetwork securityDS-10UnhealthyMarcus BellUnlinked
A maximum of 3 owners should be designated for subscriptionsHigh4sub-prod-core, sub-prod-integration, sub-prod-data, sub-prod-sharedPrivileged accessDS-10UnhealthyMarcus BellRL-113
Machines should have vulnerability findings resolvedHigh3sub-prod-dataPosture and vulnerability managementDS-07 via EndpointUnhealthySofia RomeroUnlinked
Azure SQL Database should have public network access disabledHigh2sub-prod-data, sub-nonprod-devNetwork securityDS-10UnhealthyMarcus BellUnlinked
Microsoft Defender for Containers should be enabledHigh1sub-prod-integrationPosture and vulnerability managementDS-10UnhealthyMarcus BellUnlinked
Microsoft Defender for Servers should be enabledHigh1sub-nonprod-devEndpoint securityDS-10UnhealthyMarcus BellUnlinked
Diagnostic logs should be enabled for Key Vault and App ServiceMedium5sub-prod-integration, sub-nonprod-dev, sub-prod-coreLogging and threat detectionDS-10UnhealthySofia RomeroRL-107provisional
Storage accounts should restrict network accessMedium3sub-prod-shared, sub-nonprod-devNetwork securityDS-10UnhealthyMarcus BellUnlinked
Over-provisioned identities in subscriptions should be investigatedMedium3sub-prod-integration, sub-prod-shared, sub-nonprod-devPrivileged accessDS-10UnhealthyMarcus BellRL-113provisional
Azure Key Vault should have firewall enabled or public network access disabledMedium2sub-prod-integration, sub-nonprod-devNetwork securityDS-10UnhealthyMarcus BellUnlinked
Container registries should not allow unrestricted network accessMedium1sub-prod-integrationNetwork securityDS-10UnhealthyMarcus BellUnlinked
Evidence Status is read from the DS-10 export collected on or before 31 Oct 2026. A recommendation is resolved only when a later export shows it healthy.

Cloud resource inventory

One record per Azure resource ID — resources listed in several Microsoft exports are counted once

The authoritative Azure inventory is incomplete. The Resource Graph export (DS-17) has not been collected, so this register is reconstructed from Defender for Cloud (DS-10), public IP (DS-16) and Defender for Endpoint (DS-09) exports. It is a minimum: internal load balancers and managed identities not named in a finding are not visible.
Resource register130 of 130
ResourceTypeSubscription · resource groupCriticalityPublic endpointEffective reachabilityDefenderFindingsRisk
Key Vaultsub-nonprod-dev
rg-dev-build
Non-productionPublic network accessReachability not assessedNo plan2RL-107provisional
EDI partner credentials
Key Vaultsub-prod-integration
rg-edi-app
Business criticalPublic network accessNot reachable (assessor-tested)Plan enabled2RL-107provisional
Shipment and customer delivery data
SQL databasesub-prod-data
rg-data-wms
Business criticalPublic network accessReachable (assessor-tested)Plan enabled2Unlinked
Container registrysub-prod-integration
rg-aks-integration
Business criticalPublic network accessReachability not assessedNo plan1Unlinked
App Servicesub-prod-core
rg-portal-app
Business criticalPublic network accessReachability not assessedPlan enabled1RL-107provisional
App Servicesub-prod-core
rg-portal-web
Business criticalPublic network accessReachability not assessedPlan enabled1RL-107provisional
Virtual machinesub-nonprod-dev
rg-dev-build
Non-productionpip-dev-jump-01Reachable (assessor-tested)No plan1Unlinked
App Servicesub-prod-core
rg-portal-app
StandardPublic network accessReachability not assessedPlan enabled1RL-107provisional
SQL databasesub-nonprod-dev
rg-dev-build
Non-productionPublic network accessReachability not assessedNo plan1Unlinked
Storage accountsub-nonprod-dev
rg-dev-build
Non-productionPublic network accessReachability not assessedNo plan1Unlinked
Storage accountsub-prod-shared
rg-shared-logs
StandardPublic network accessReachability not assessedPlan enabled1Unlinked
Storage accountsub-prod-shared
rg-shared-logs
StandardPublic network accessReachability not assessedPlan enabled1Unlinked
Application gatewaysub-prod-shared
rg-shared-gateways
Business criticalpip-agw-ediReachability not assessedNot applicable0Unlinked
Application gatewaysub-prod-shared
rg-shared-gateways
Business criticalpip-agw-portalReachable (assessor-tested)Not applicable0Unlinked
Kubernetes clustersub-prod-integration
rg-aks-integration
Business criticalpip-aks-ingressReachability not assessedNo plan0Unlinked

Internet exposure & reachability

Seven distinct states — a public IP is not proof of internet exposure, and exposure is not exploitation

Exposure register22 internet-facing resources1 public IP(s) not associated with any resource — not counted as exposure
ResourceTypePublic endpointNetwork restrictionsEffective reachabilityExposed ports / servicesKnown vulnerabilitiesIdentity permissionsCriticalityConfidenceRisk
Application gatewaypip-agw-portalUnknown — no NSG/firewall exportReachable (assessor-tested)443/HTTPStested 18 JunNot applicableNot assessed — no RBAC exportBusiness criticalLow confidenceUnlinked
Virtual machinepip-az-web-01Unknown — no NSG/firewall exportReachable (assessor-tested)443/HTTPStested 18 Jun0 critical/high (DS-07)Not assessed — no RBAC exportBusiness criticalLow confidenceUnlinked
Virtual machinepip-az-web-02Unknown — no NSG/firewall exportReachable (assessor-tested)443/HTTPS (3389 closed — JIT)tested 21 Aug0 critical/high (DS-07)Not assessed — no RBAC exportBusiness criticalLow confidenceUnlinked
Virtual machinepip-az-web-03Unknown — no NSG/firewall exportReachable (assessor-tested)443/HTTPStested 18 Jun0 critical/high (DS-07)Not assessed — no RBAC exportBusiness criticalLow confidenceUnlinked
Load balancerpip-lb-sftpUnknown — no NSG/firewall exportReachable (assessor-tested)22/SFTPtested 18 JunNot applicableNot assessed — no RBAC exportBusiness criticalLow confidenceUnlinked
SQL databasePublic network accessOpen: All (no network restriction) (MDC-05)Reachable (assessor-tested)1433/TDStested 20 OctNot applicableVendor SQL login, db_datareader (assessor)Business criticalLow confidenceUnlinked
Virtual machinepip-dev-jump-01Open: 22/SSH (MDC-03)Reachable (assessor-tested)22/SSHtested 20 Oct0 critical/high (DS-07)mi-dev-pipeline — Reader on sub-prod-data (assessor)Non-productionLow confidenceUnlinked
Container registryPublic network accessOpen: All (no network restriction) (MDC-16)Reachability not assessedAll (no network restriction)Not applicableNot assessed — no RBAC exportBusiness criticalMedium confidenceUnlinked
Key VaultPublic network accessOpen: All (no network restriction) (MDC-06)Not reachable (assessor-tested)443 — connection refused by service firewall defaulttested 20 OctNot applicableNot assessed — no RBAC exportBusiness criticalLow confidenceRL-107provisional
Key VaultPublic network accessOpen: All (no network restriction) (MDC-06)Reachability not assessedAll (no network restriction)Not applicableNot assessed — no RBAC exportNon-productionMedium confidenceRL-107provisional
Storage accountPublic network accessOpen: All (no network restriction) (MDC-02)Reachability not assessedAll (no network restriction)Not applicableNot assessed — no RBAC exportNon-productionMedium confidenceUnlinked
Storage accountPublic network accessOpen: All (no network restriction) (MDC-02)Reachability not assessedAll (no network restriction)Not applicableNot assessed — no RBAC exportStandardMedium confidenceUnlinked
Storage accountPublic network accessOpen: All (no network restriction) (MDC-02)Reachability not assessedAll (no network restriction)Not applicableNot assessed — no RBAC exportStandardMedium confidenceUnlinked
Application gatewaypip-agw-ediUnknown — no NSG/firewall exportReachability not assessedNot assessedNot applicableNot assessed — no RBAC exportBusiness criticalLow confidenceUnlinked
Kubernetes clusterpip-aks-ingressUnknown — no NSG/firewall exportReachability not assessedNot assessedNot applicableNot assessed — no RBAC exportBusiness criticalLow confidenceUnlinked
App ServicePublic network accessUnknown — no NSG/firewall exportReachability not assessedNot assessedNot applicableNot assessed — no RBAC exportBusiness criticalLow confidenceRL-107provisional
App ServicePublic network accessUnknown — no NSG/firewall exportReachability not assessedNot assessedNot applicableNot assessed — no RBAC exportBusiness criticalLow confidenceUnlinked
App ServicePublic network accessUnknown — no NSG/firewall exportReachability not assessedNot assessedNot applicableNot assessed — no RBAC exportBusiness criticalLow confidenceRL-107provisional
App ServicePublic network accessUnknown — no NSG/firewall exportReachability not assessedNot assessedNot applicableNot assessed — no RBAC exportNon-productionLow confidenceUnlinked
App ServicePublic network accessUnknown — no NSG/firewall exportReachability not assessedNot assessedNot applicableNot assessed — no RBAC exportStandardLow confidenceUnlinked
App ServicePublic network accessUnknown — no NSG/firewall exportReachability not assessedNot assessedNot applicableNot assessed — no RBAC exportStandardLow confidenceRL-107provisional
SQL databasePublic network accessUnknown — no NSG/firewall exportReachability not assessedNot assessedNot applicableNot assessed — no RBAC exportNon-productionLow confidenceUnlinked

Attack paths

Entry point → exploitable weakness → privilege or lateral movement → business impact

No tool-identified attack paths. The Defender for Cloud attack-path export (DS-12) has never been collected, so critical and high attack-path counts are Not assessed. The paths below were built by the assessor from observed preconditions; none is a Defender for Cloud finding and no exploitation is claimed.
Tool-identified critical/high
Not assessed
Assessor scenarios (open)
3
Entry points
3
Privilege escalation / lateral
2
Sensitive data targets
3
Open SQL firewall → WMS shipment dataUnlinkedReview MRQ-03
  1. Entry pointPublic SQL endpointsql-wms-reportingDS-10 Defender for Cloud recommendations
  2. Exploitable weaknessPassword-based SQL loginssql-wms-reportingAssumed (hypothetical)
  3. Privilege or lateral movementReporting login reads all schemasAssessor-reported
  4. Business impactShipment and customer dataAssumed (hypothetical)
Preconditions
Public network access enabled (DS-10) · Firewall allows 0.0.0.0–255.255.255.255 (DS-10) · Reachable on 1433 (assessor test, 20 Oct)
Potential impact
Customer personal data exposure and loss of WMS reporting integrity.
Recommended remediation
Remove the AllowAll rule (MDC-05), disable public access (MDC-04), move the vendor to Entra authentication.
Confidence · source evidence
Low confidence Hypothetical scenario

Cloud data protection

Public endpoint, public access permitted, anonymous access, authenticated access and confirmed unauthorised exposure are different states

Data storeTypeData heldPublic endpointPublic access permittedAnonymous accessPrivate endpointEncryptionRisk
Potentially exposed
SQL databaseShipment and customer delivery dataYesYesN/A — auth requiredNoTDE (service-managed key)Unlinked
Potentially exposed
Key VaultEDI partner credentialsYesYesN/A — auth requiredNoNot assessedRL-107provisional
Potentially exposed
Storage account—YesNoNone evidencedNoPlatform-managed keysUnlinked
Potentially exposed
Storage account—YesNoNone evidencedNoPlatform-managed keysUnlinked
Potentially exposed
Storage account—YesNoNone evidencedNoPlatform-managed keysUnlinked
Potentially exposed
Key Vault—YesYesN/A — auth requiredNoNot assessedRL-107provisional
Storage accountShipment manifests — customer contact detailsNoNoNone evidencedYesPlatform-managed keysUnlinked
Storage accountEDI archive — customer contact detailsNoNoNone evidencedYesPlatform-managed keysUnlinked
Storage accountProof-of-delivery images and signaturesNoNoNone evidencedYesPlatform-managed keysUnlinked
Storage accountTracking exports for retail customersNoNoNone evidencedYesPlatform-managed keysUnlinked
Storage accountCustoms declarationsNoNoNone evidencedYesCustomer-managed keys (kv-data-prod)Unlinked
Storage accountWMS operational reportsNoNoNone evidencedYesPlatform-managed keysUnlinked
Storage accountBackup copiesNoNoNone evidencedYesPlatform-managed keysUnlinked
SQL databaseCustomer portal accountsNoNoN/A — auth requiredYesTDE (service-managed key)Unlinked
SQL databaseEDI transactionsNoNoN/A — auth requiredYesTDE (service-managed key)Unlinked
SQL databaseCustoms declarationsNoNoN/A — auth requiredYesTDE (customer-managed key)Unlinked
SQL databaseHistorical shipment recordsNoNoN/A — auth requiredYesTDE disabled until 20 Jul 2026, then service-managed keyUnlinked
Key VaultPortal secrets and certificatesNoNoN/A — auth requiredYesNot assessedUnlinked
Key VaultCustomer-managed encryption keysNoNoN/A — auth requiredYesNot assessedUnlinked
Key VaultTLS certificatesNoNoN/A — auth requiredYesNot assessedUnlinked
SQL database—YesNoN/A — auth requiredNoTDE (service-managed key)Unlinked

Confirmed unauthorised exposure is “Not determined” for every store: no data-plane access logs have been collected and no cloud incident is recorded.

Cloud workload protection

Plan enablement, resource coverage, healthy telemetry and effective protection are separate — server figures reuse Endpoint Security evidence

Defender plans by subscription
SubscriptionServersSQLStorageKey VaultApp ServiceContainers
sub-prod-core
sub-prod-integration
sub-prod-data
sub-prod-shared
sub-nonprod-dev
Resources covered50/605/617/184/57/80/2

Plan state is inferred from Defender for Cloud “should be enabled” recommendations (DS-10). A direct plan-coverage export is proposed as DS-42 (v4.0).

Azure virtual machines · 60 (same assets as Endpoint SRV-Azure-IaaS)

10 VMs in sub-nonprod-dev have no Defender for Servers plan but are onboarded to Defender for Endpoint — counts match the Endpoint Security register.

Cloud identity & permissions

Azure RBAC and workload identities. Entra directory roles and app consent are covered on Identity & Access — no identity risk is duplicated here

Owner assignments by subscription
SubscriptionOwnersUser accounts
sub-prod-core73
sub-prod-integration62
sub-prod-data52
sub-prod-shared52
Assessor 23 Azure Owner assignments are assessor-reported. No dedicated Azure RBAC dataset has been ingested or validated.
Workload identities with findings
IdentityRoles (scope)Cross-subscriptionSourceRisk
mi-integration-sync
Writes EDI files to data stores; subscription-wide Contributor is broader than required.
Contributor (sub-prod-integration)
Contributor (sub-prod-data)
YesDefender for Cloud permissions finding (MDC-14) · role scope assessor-reportedRL-113provisional
mi-automation
Owner can assign roles — a privilege escalation route to anyone who can edit the runbooks.
Owner (sub-prod-shared)
NoDefender for Cloud permissions finding (MDC-14) · role scope assessor-reportedRL-113provisional
mi-dev-pipeline
A non-production identity with read access to production data.
Contributor (sub-nonprod-dev)
Reader (sub-prod-data)
YesDefender for Cloud permissions finding (MDC-14) · role scope assessor-reportedUnlinked

No role or identity is described as unused: there is no activity evidence (proposed DS-40). 5 privileged Entra service principals are listed on Identity & Access.

Management intervention required

Top three cloud issues at this assessment

  1. 1MRQ-03Unlinked
    WMS reporting database open to all IP addresses
    Public endpoint with an AllowAll firewall rule on a store of customer delivery data — reachable in the assessor test. No material risk covers it.
    Decision: Decide whether this is a material risk (MRQ-03) and approve removal of the AllowAll rule.
    Owner: Marcus Bell
  2. 2MRQ-05Unlinked
    Management port open to the internet on AZ-LNX-16
    SSH on a non-production jump host with no Defender for Servers plan and a pipeline identity that can read production.
    Decision: Decide materiality (MRQ-05); require Bastion for all administrative access.
    Owner: Marcus Bell
  3. 23 standing Owner assignments (assessor-reported)
    A single compromised engineer could destroy production infrastructure (RL-113).
    Decision: Hold to the PIM conversion date (A-1131, 30 Nov).
    Owner: Marcus Bell
Outstanding decisions (1)
RL-107Approve the increased Sentinel ingestion budget (approx. £38k a year) for depot firewall logs.
Decision owner Priya Shah · needed by 20 Nov 2026 (20 days) · open RL-107
Materiality review queue (3)

Not material risks — queued for management to assess. No risk is created automatically.

  • MRQ-03Unlinkedby 1 Dec
    Azure SQL reporting database open to all IP addresses
    sql-wms-reporting has public network access enabled and, since 10 Jun 2026, a firewall rule allowing 0.0.0.0–255.255.255.255. It holds shipment and customer delivery data and was reachable on 1433 in the assessor test of 20 Oct.
    Awaiting materiality assessment · queued 13 Nov 2026 · decision owner Tom Whitfield
  • MRQ-04Unlinkedby 1 Dec
    Defender plan gaps — container platform and non-production servers
    Defender for Containers is not enabled for aks-integration and acrhalcyonprod (from Aug 2026), and Defender for Servers is not enabled on sub-nonprod-dev (10 VMs, already onboarded to Defender for Endpoint).
    Awaiting materiality assessment · queued 13 Nov 2026 · decision owner Tom Whitfield
  • MRQ-05Unlinkedby 1 Dec
    Internet-exposed SSH on a non-production jump host
    AZ-LNX-16 (pip-dev-jump-01) exposes 22/SSH to the internet from 10 Aug 2026, reachable in the assessor test of 20 Oct. Its pipeline identity holds Reader on sub-prod-data.
    Awaiting materiality assessment · queued 13 Nov 2026 · decision owner Tom Whitfield

Priority cloud remediation

Shared remediation records · 6 open · 0 overdue

ActionRiskOwnerTargetProgressEvidence of closure
Restrict user consent to verified publishers
A-1161
RL-116Marcus Bell12 Nov 26 In 12dNot yet due
Onboard depot firewall syslog (18 sources)
A-1072
RL-107Sofia Romero30 Nov 26 In 30dNot yet due
Convert standing Owner roles to PIM-eligible
A-1131
RL-113Marcus Bell30 Nov 26 In 30dNot yet due
Review and revoke unjustified high-privilege grants
A-1162
RL-116Marcus Bell18 Dec 26 In 48dNot yet due
Quarterly Azure RBAC access review
A-1132
RL-113Marcus Bell20 Dec 26 In 50dNot yet due
Build WMS audit log parser and analytics rules
A-1073
RL-107Sofia Romero31 Jan 27 In 92dNot yet due

Defender for Cloud remediation

Recommendation-level status — closure is evidenced only by a later DS-10 export; findings without a register action have no target date

ThemeRecommendationLevelOwnerTargetEvidence of closure
Public endpoint restrictionMDC-03Management ports should be closed on your virtual machinesCriticalMarcus BellPending MRQ-05Open — 1 resource(s)
Public endpoint restrictionMDC-05SQL server firewall should not allow all IP addressesCriticalMarcus BellPending MRQ-03Open — 1 resource(s)
Excessive cloud permissionsMDC-07A maximum of 3 owners should be designated for subscriptionsHighMarcus BellVia RL-113 actionsOpen — 4 resource(s)
Workload protectionMDC-10Machines should have vulnerability findings resolvedHighSofia RomeroNot setOpen — 3 resource(s)
Public endpoint restrictionMDC-04Azure SQL Database should have public network access disabledHighMarcus BellPending MRQ-03Open — 2 resource(s)
Workload protectionMDC-08Microsoft Defender for Containers should be enabledHighMarcus BellPending MRQ-04Open — 1 resource(s)
Workload protectionMDC-09Microsoft Defender for Servers should be enabledHighMarcus BellPending MRQ-04Open — 1 resource(s)
Missing monitoringMDC-11Diagnostic logs should be enabled for Key Vault and App ServiceMediumSofia RomeroVia RL-107 actionsOpen — 5 resource(s)
Public endpoint restrictionMDC-02Storage accounts should restrict network accessMediumMarcus BellNot setOpen — 3 resource(s)
Excessive cloud permissionsMDC-14Over-provisioned identities in subscriptions should be investigatedMediumMarcus BellVia RL-113 actionsOpen — 3 resource(s)
Public endpoint restrictionMDC-06Azure Key Vault should have firewall enabled or public network access disabledMediumMarcus BellNot setOpen — 2 resource(s)
Public endpoint restrictionMDC-16Container registries should not allow unrestricted network accessMediumMarcus BellNot setOpen — 1 resource(s)
Critical cloud exposureMDC-01Storage account public (anonymous) blob access should be disallowedCriticalMarcus BellVia RL-105 actionsHealthy in 26 Oct export
Public endpoint restrictionMDC-13Web Application Firewall should be in Prevention mode for Application GatewayHighMarcus BellNot setHealthy in 26 Oct export
Critical cloud exposureMDC-12App Service apps should only be accessible over HTTPSMediumMarcus BellNot setHealthy in 26 Oct export
Critical cloud exposureMDC-15Transparent Data Encryption on SQL databases should be enabledLowMarcus BellNot setHealthy in 26 Oct export
Outstanding evidence:DS-19 Log Analytics ingestion & retention · MissingDS-17 Azure Resource Graph inventory · MissingDS-12 Defender for Cloud attack-path export · MissingEvidence & Uploads →

Proposed evidence catalogue v4.0 — cloud and exposure additions

Preview only — not approved and not applied to any assessment. Catalogue v1.0, v2.0 and v3.0 are unchanged (46 datasets · 113 controls if approved). Proposed effective date: from the Jan 2027 assessment, prospectively and subject to approval.

DS-39
Azure RBAC role assignments
The only evidence of Owner and Contributor counts, cross-subscription access and managed identity permissions. Today RL-113's 23 Owner assignments are assessor-reported.
DS-40
Azure Activity Log — role and identity usage
Without activity evidence no role or identity can be described as unused.
DS-41
NSG, Azure Firewall rules and effective routes
Distinguishes a public IP or endpoint from a network path that actually permits inbound traffic.
DS-42
Defender for Cloud plan coverage
Plan state is currently inferred from recommendations; a direct export shows coverage gaps and exceptions.
DS-43
Data store access configuration (Storage, SQL, Key Vault)
Anonymous container access is currently assessor-confirmed; this evidences it directly and shows encryption settings.
DS-44
External attack surface and reachability results
Effective reachability is currently based on occasional assessor tests.
DS-45
Defender XDR Exposure Management — attack paths and choke points
The only tool evidence that a cross-domain route exists end to end. Today every Exposure & Attack Paths route is assessor-inferred or hypothetical.
DS-46
Privileged access workstation inventory
Needed to evaluate whether a compromised workstation could reach cloud administration (route XAP-1).
New controls
CLD-12 Effective internet reachability assessed for public resources · CLD-13 Privileged Azure RBAC assignments reviewed against usage · CLD-14 Data store anonymous and public access prevented · DEF-10 Attack paths to business-critical assets reviewed monthly · IAM-16 Administrative access only from managed privileged workstations
Future impact · historical restatement preview — not applied
AssessmentCoverage applied → v3.0 → v4.0Cyber Risk Index
May 202632% → 31% → 27%57 → 57 → 58
Jun 202638% → 36% → 31%58 → 59 → 59
Jul 202642% → 39% → 35%50 → 50 → 51
Aug 202649% → 45% → 40%45 → 45 → 46
Sep 202657% → 53% → 47%40 → 41 → 42
Oct 202662% → 57% → 51%35 → 36 → 37

Applied values are those in force (v1.0) and shown on the Executive Overview. v3.0 is approved from Dec 2026; the v4.0 column adds the proposed cloud datasets on top. More requirements lower coverage until new datasets are collected.

RiskLens · Demonstration build · Azure resources, findings and identities are fictional. “Evidence-backed” refers to simulated evidence, not independent validation.