Cloud Security
Azure posture, resource inventory, internet exposure, attack paths, data protection, workloads and permissions. As at 31 Oct 2026 · compared with 30 Sept 2026
Azure security posture
Defender for Cloud recommendations, Azure Secure Score and regulatory compliance — recommendation counts are not resource or vulnerability counts
Cloud resource inventory
One record per Azure resource ID — resources listed in several Microsoft exports are counted once
Internet exposure & reachability
Seven distinct states — a public IP is not proof of internet exposure, and exposure is not exploitation
Attack paths
Entry point → exploitable weakness → privilege or lateral movement → business impact
- Entry pointPublic SQL endpointsql-wms-reportingDS-10 Defender for Cloud recommendations
- Exploitable weaknessPassword-based SQL loginssql-wms-reportingAssumed (hypothetical)
- Privilege or lateral movementReporting login reads all schemasAssessor-reported
- Business impactShipment and customer dataAssumed (hypothetical)
- Preconditions
- Public network access enabled (DS-10) · Firewall allows 0.0.0.0–255.255.255.255 (DS-10) · Reachable on 1433 (assessor test, 20 Oct)
- Potential impact
- Customer personal data exposure and loss of WMS reporting integrity.
- Recommended remediation
- Remove the AllowAll rule (MDC-05), disable public access (MDC-04), move the vendor to Entra authentication.
- Confidence · source evidence
- Low confidence Hypothetical scenario
Cloud data protection
Public endpoint, public access permitted, anonymous access, authenticated access and confirmed unauthorised exposure are different states
Confirmed unauthorised exposure is “Not determined” for every store: no data-plane access logs have been collected and no cloud incident is recorded.
Cloud workload protection
Plan enablement, resource coverage, healthy telemetry and effective protection are separate — server figures reuse Endpoint Security evidence
Plan state is inferred from Defender for Cloud “should be enabled” recommendations (DS-10). A direct plan-coverage export is proposed as DS-42 (v4.0).
10 VMs in sub-nonprod-dev have no Defender for Servers plan but are onboarded to Defender for Endpoint — counts match the Endpoint Security register.
Cloud identity & permissions
Azure RBAC and workload identities. Entra directory roles and app consent are covered on Identity & Access — no identity risk is duplicated here
No role or identity is described as unused: there is no activity evidence (proposed DS-40). 5 privileged Entra service principals are listed on Identity & Access.
Management intervention required
Top three cloud issues at this assessment
- 1MRQ-03UnlinkedWMS reporting database open to all IP addressesPublic endpoint with an AllowAll firewall rule on a store of customer delivery data — reachable in the assessor test. No material risk covers it.Decision: Decide whether this is a material risk (MRQ-03) and approve removal of the AllowAll rule.Owner: Marcus Bell
- 2MRQ-05UnlinkedManagement port open to the internet on AZ-LNX-16SSH on a non-production jump host with no Defender for Servers plan and a pipeline identity that can read production.Decision: Decide materiality (MRQ-05); require Bastion for all administrative access.Owner: Marcus Bell
- 23 standing Owner assignments (assessor-reported)A single compromised engineer could destroy production infrastructure (RL-113).Decision: Hold to the PIM conversion date (A-1131, 30 Nov).Owner: Marcus Bell
RL-107Approve the increased Sentinel ingestion budget (approx. £38k a year) for depot firewall logs.
Not material risks — queued for management to assess. No risk is created automatically.
- MRQ-03Unlinkedby 1 DecAzure SQL reporting database open to all IP addressessql-wms-reporting has public network access enabled and, since 10 Jun 2026, a firewall rule allowing 0.0.0.0–255.255.255.255. It holds shipment and customer delivery data and was reachable on 1433 in the assessor test of 20 Oct.Awaiting materiality assessment · queued 13 Nov 2026 · decision owner Tom Whitfield
- MRQ-04Unlinkedby 1 DecDefender plan gaps — container platform and non-production serversDefender for Containers is not enabled for aks-integration and acrhalcyonprod (from Aug 2026), and Defender for Servers is not enabled on sub-nonprod-dev (10 VMs, already onboarded to Defender for Endpoint).Awaiting materiality assessment · queued 13 Nov 2026 · decision owner Tom Whitfield
- MRQ-05Unlinkedby 1 DecInternet-exposed SSH on a non-production jump hostAZ-LNX-16 (pip-dev-jump-01) exposes 22/SSH to the internet from 10 Aug 2026, reachable in the assessor test of 20 Oct. Its pipeline identity holds Reader on sub-prod-data.Awaiting materiality assessment · queued 13 Nov 2026 · decision owner Tom Whitfield
Priority cloud remediation
Shared remediation records · 6 open · 0 overdue
Defender for Cloud remediation
Recommendation-level status — closure is evidenced only by a later DS-10 export; findings without a register action have no target date
Proposed evidence catalogue v4.0 — cloud and exposure additions
Preview only — not approved and not applied to any assessment. Catalogue v1.0, v2.0 and v3.0 are unchanged (46 datasets · 113 controls if approved). Proposed effective date: from the Jan 2027 assessment, prospectively and subject to approval.
Applied values are those in force (v1.0) and shown on the Executive Overview. v3.0 is approved from Dec 2026; the v4.0 column adds the proposed cloud datasets on top. More requirements lower coverage until new datasets are collected.
RiskLens · Demonstration build · Azure resources, findings and identities are fictional. “Evidence-backed” refers to simulated evidence, not independent validation.