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Halcyon Freight GroupDEMO

Identity & Access

Authentication strength, privileged access, Conditional Access and application identities. As at 31 Oct 2026 · compared with 30 Sept 2026

DEMO data. Synthetic identities and findings; nothing is saved.
Evidence-backedPartial evidenceAssessor-reportedNot assessed

MFA & authentication security

Registration, enforcement and method strength are assessed separately

MFA capable is a Secure Score-derived proxy, not verified MFA registration. A registered method does not prove MFA is enforced, and a policy that requires MFA does not prove a user is protected at sign-in. Phishing-resistant methods are reported separately from push, SMS and voice.

Privileged access security

PIM eligibility is reported, but is not treated as proof that access is appropriately controlled

Privileged identity register43 of 43
IdentityIdentity typePrivileged roleAssignmentMFA strengthPIM statusLast activityRiskMaterial risk
Ellie ShawAssessor
adm-eshaw@halcyonfreight.demo
Cloud admin accountApplication AdministratorT0PermanentPhishing-resistant
reported · unverified
StandingNot assessedHighRL-101
Jack TurnerAssessor
adm-jturner@halcyonfreight.demo
Cloud admin accountApplication AdministratorT0PermanentPhishing-resistant
reported · unverified
StandingNot assessedHighRL-101
Automation runbooksEvidence
sp-automation-ops
Service principalApplication.ReadWrite.All (app role)T0PermanentNot applicableN/A — app permissionNot assessedHighUnlinked
Imogen HaleAssessor
adm-ihale@halcyonfreight.demo
Cloud admin accountConditional Access AdministratorT0PermanentPhishing-resistant
reported · unverified
StandingNot assessedHighRL-101
Kofi MensahAssessor
adm-kmensah@halcyonfreight.demo
Cloud admin accountConditional Access AdministratorT0PermanentPhishing-resistant
reported · unverified
StandingNot assessedHighRL-101
Legacy WMS syncEvidence
sp-wms-sync
Service principalDirectory.ReadWrite.All (app role)T0PermanentNot applicableN/A — app permissionNot assessedHighRL-103provisional
Hannah LewisAssessor
adm-hlewis@halcyonfreight.demo
Cloud admin accountGlobal AdministratorT0PermanentPhishing-resistant
reported · unverified
StandingNot assessedHighRL-101
Ravi PatelAssessor
adm-rpatel@halcyonfreight.demo
Cloud admin accountGlobal AdministratorT0PermanentPhishing-resistant
reported · unverified
StandingNot assessedHighRL-101
Megan DoyleAssessor
adm-mdoyle@halcyonfreight.demo
Cloud admin accountGlobal AdministratorT0PermanentPhishing-resistant
reported · unverified
StandingNot assessedHighRL-101
Owen PriceAssessor
adm-oprice@halcyonfreight.demo
Cloud admin accountGlobal AdministratorT0PermanentPhishing-resistant
reported · unverified
StandingNot assessedHighRL-101
Leah GrantAssessor
adm-lgrant@halcyonfreight.demo
Cloud admin accountPrivileged Role AdministratorT0PermanentPhishing-resistant
reported · unverified
StandingNot assessedHighRL-101
Tariq AzizAssessor
adm-taziz@halcyonfreight.demo
Cloud admin accountPrivileged Role AdministratorT0PermanentPhishing-resistant
reported · unverified
StandingNot assessedHighRL-101
Chloe BarnesAssessor
adm-cbarnes@halcyonfreight.demo
Cloud admin accountPrivileged Role AdministratorT0PermanentPhishing-resistant
reported · unverified
StandingNot assessedHighRL-101
Sam WhitakerAssessor
adm-swhitaker@halcyonfreight.demo
Cloud admin accountPrivileged Role AdministratorT0PermanentPhishing-resistant
reported · unverified
StandingNot assessedHighRL-101
Emergency access 1Assessor
breakglass-01@halcyonfreight.demo
Emergency accessGlobal AdministratorT0PermanentPhishing-resistant
reported · unverified
StandingNot assessedMediumRL-101
Emergency access 2Assessor
breakglass-02@halcyonfreight.demo
Emergency accessGlobal AdministratorT0PermanentPhishing-resistant
reported · unverified
StandingNot assessedMediumRL-101
Zara AhmedAssessor
adm-zahmed@halcyonfreight.demo
Cloud admin accountExchange AdministratorPermanentStandard (push / SMS)StandingNot assessedMediumRL-101
Rhys MorganAssessor
adm-rmorgan@halcyonfreight.demo
Cloud admin accountExchange AdministratorPermanentStandard (push / SMS)StandingNot assessedMediumRL-101
Amira SalehAssessor
adm-asaleh@halcyonfreight.demo
Synced userExchange AdministratorPermanentStandard (push / SMS)StandingNot assessedMediumRL-101
Callum ReidAssessor
adm-creid@halcyonfreight.demo
Cloud admin accountExchange AdministratorPermanentStandard (push / SMS)StandingNot assessedMediumRL-101
Priya DesaiAssessor
adm-pdesai@halcyonfreight.demo
Cloud admin accountExchange AdministratorPermanentStandard (push / SMS)StandingNot assessedMediumRL-101
Backup connectorEvidence
sp-backup-m365
Service principalExchange Administrator (directory role)PermanentNot applicableN/A — app permissionNot assessedMediumRL-106provisional
Holly DeanAssessor
adm-hdean@halcyonfreight.demo
Synced userIntune AdministratorPermanentStandard (push / SMS)StandingNot assessedMediumRL-101
Noah GrantAssessor
adm-ngrant@halcyonfreight.demo
Cloud admin accountIntune AdministratorPermanentStandard (push / SMS)StandingNot assessedMediumRL-101
Maya IqbalAssessor
adm-miqbal@halcyonfreight.demo
Cloud admin accountIntune AdministratorPermanentStandard (push / SMS)StandingNot assessedMediumRL-101
Toby EllisAssessor
adm-tellis@halcyonfreight.demo
Synced userIntune AdministratorPermanentStandard (push / SMS)StandingNot assessedMediumRL-101
Joe HardingAssessor
adm-jharding@halcyonfreight.demo
Synced userSecurity AdministratorPermanentStandard (push / SMS)StandingNot assessedMediumRL-101
Sophie LamAssessor
adm-slam@halcyonfreight.demo
Cloud admin accountSecurity AdministratorPermanentStandard (push / SMS)StandingNot assessedMediumRL-101
Will BennettAssessor
adm-wbennett@halcyonfreight.demo
Cloud admin accountSecurity AdministratorPermanentStandard (push / SMS)StandingNot assessedMediumRL-101
SIEM connectorEvidence
sp-sentinel-connector
Service principalSecurity Reader (directory role)PermanentNot applicableN/A — app permissionNot assessedMediumUnlinked
Ethan WardAssessor
adm-eward@halcyonfreight.demo
Synced userSharePoint AdministratorPermanentStandard (push / SMS)StandingNot assessedMediumRL-101
Lucy PearceAssessor
adm-lpearce@halcyonfreight.demo
Cloud admin accountSharePoint AdministratorPermanentStandard (push / SMS)StandingNot assessedMediumRL-101
Adam KerrAssessor
adm-akerr@halcyonfreight.demo
Cloud admin accountSharePoint AdministratorPermanentStandard (push / SMS)StandingNot assessedMediumRL-101
Marcus WebbAssessor
adm-mwebb@halcyonfreight.demo
Synced userUser AdministratorPermanentStandard (push / SMS)StandingNot assessedMediumRL-101
Ruth OkoyeAssessor
adm-rokoye@halcyonfreight.demo
Cloud admin accountUser AdministratorPermanentStandard (push / SMS)StandingNot assessedMediumRL-101
HR provisioningEvidence
sp-hr-provisioning
Service principalUser Administrator (directory role)PermanentNot applicableN/A — app permissionNot assessedMediumUnlinked
Nadia HussainAssessor
adm-nhussain@halcyonfreight.demo
Synced userExchange AdministratorEligible (PIM)Standard (push / SMS)EligibleNot assessedLowRL-101
Ben CarterAssessor
adm-bcarter@halcyonfreight.demo
Cloud admin accountExchange AdministratorEligible (PIM)Standard (push / SMS)EligibleNot assessedLowRL-101
Freya WalshAssessor
adm-fwalsh@halcyonfreight.demo
Cloud admin accountExchange AdministratorEligible (PIM)Standard (push / SMS)EligibleNot assessedLowRL-101
Liam O'ConnorAssessor
adm-loconnor@halcyonfreight.demo
Synced userExchange AdministratorEligible (PIM)Standard (push / SMS)EligibleNot assessedLowRL-101
Ana CostaAssessor
adm-acosta@halcyonfreight.demo
Synced userUser AdministratorEligible (PIM)Standard (push / SMS)EligibleNot assessedLowRL-101
Dan FletcherAssessor
adm-dfletcher@halcyonfreight.demo
Cloud admin accountUser AdministratorEligible (PIM)Standard (push / SMS)EligibleNot assessedLowRL-101
Isla BurkeAssessor
adm-iburke@halcyonfreight.demo
Cloud admin accountUser AdministratorEligible (PIM)Standard (push / SMS)EligibleNot assessedLowRL-101

Conditional Access

A policy's existence is configuration evidence — not proof of effective protection at sign-in

What each figure measures
Export completeness 60%
Share of the 25 tenant policies captured in DS-03 (enabled only). Data completeness — not protection.
Baseline protections enabled
Configuration evidence from DS-03. Shown as the KPI.
Users protected at sign-in
Needs excluded-group membership and sign-in logs. The earlier 90% was withdrawn — it relied on unevidenced exclusion counts.
Policy register25 of 25
PolicyStateUsersApplicationsGrant / sessionAuth strengthExclusionsConfigurationGaps
Require MFA for all users
CA001
EnabledAll usersAll cloud appsRequire multifactor authenticationMultifactor authentication (any method)3 groupsEvidence2
Block legacy authentication
CA002
EnabledAll usersAll cloud appsBlock access—1 groupEvidence—
Require MFA for administrators
CA003
EnabledDirectory roles: 14 privileged rolesAll cloud appsRequire multifactor authenticationMultifactor authentication (any method)1 groupEvidence1
Require phishing-resistant MFA for administrators
CA004
Report-onlyDirectory roles: 14 privileged rolesAll cloud appsRequire authentication strengthPhishing-resistant MFA1 groupAssessor2
Require compliant device for Microsoft 365
CA005
EnabledAll usersOffice 365Require device to be marked as compliant—2 groupsEvidence1
Block sign-ins from outside approved countries
CA006
EnabledAll usersAll cloud appsBlock access—2 groupsEvidence1
Require MFA for Azure management
CA007
EnabledAll usersMicrosoft Azure ManagementRequire multifactor authenticationMultifactor authentication (any method)1 groupEvidence—
Block high sign-in risk
CA008
DisabledAll usersAll cloud appsBlock access—NoneAssessor2
Require password change for high user risk
CA009
DisabledAll usersAll cloud appsRequire password change, Require MFA—NoneAssessor2
Require MFA for guest users
CA010
EnabledAll guest and external usersAll cloud appsRequire multifactor authenticationMultifactor authentication (any method)NoneEvidence—
Admin sign-in frequency — 4 hours
CA011
Report-onlyDirectory roles: 14 privileged rolesAll cloud appsSign-in frequency: 4 hours, Persistent browser: never—1 groupAssessor2
Require app protection policy on mobile
CA012
Report-onlyAll usersOffice 365Require app protection policy—NoneAssessor2
Block device code flow
CA013
Report-onlyAll usersAll cloud appsBlock access—1 groupAssessor2
Require MFA to register security information
CA014
EnabledAll usersUser action: register security informationRequire multifactor authentication—NoneEvidence—
Depot kiosks — trusted location access
CA015
EnabledDepot kiosk usersWarehouse management, TeamsGrant access—NoneEvidence1
Pilot — passwordless for IT staff
CA016
DisabledIT staff groupAll cloud appsRequire authentication strengthPasswordless MFANoneAssessor2
Terms of use for guests
CA017
EnabledAll guest and external usersAll cloud appsRequire terms of use—NoneEvidence—
Block unknown device platforms
CA019
EnabledAll usersAll cloud appsBlock access—1 groupEvidence—
Require MFA for Microsoft admin portals
CA020
EnabledAll usersMicrosoft Admin PortalsRequire multifactor authenticationMultifactor authentication (any method)1 groupEvidence—
Require MFA for device enrolment
CA021
EnabledAll usersUser action: register or join devicesRequire multifactor authentication—NoneEvidence—
Block guest access to Azure management
CA022
EnabledAll guest and external usersMicrosoft Azure ManagementBlock access—NoneEvidence—
Require MFA for SharePoint external sharing
CA023
EnabledAll guest and external usersSharePoint OnlineRequire multifactor authentication—NoneEvidence—
Test — require MFA for finance application
CA024
DisabledFinance pilot groupFinance ERPRequire multifactor authentication—NoneAssessor2
Block downloads on unmanaged devices
CA025
Report-onlyAll usersOffice 365Use app enforced restrictions—NoneAssessor2
Old — trusted IP bypass for head office
CA026
DisabledAll usersAll cloud appsGrant access—NoneAssessor2

Risky users & authentication activity

Identity threat monitoring

Not assessed
Evidence required to assess
  • Entra sign-in logs — The only evidence that MFA and Conditional Access were actually enforced at sign-in, and of account and application activity.
  • Entra ID Protection — risky users and detections — Required to assess risky users, impossible travel, password spray and investigation status.
  • PIM configuration and activity — Eligibility alone does not prove control — role settings and activation activity show whether just-in-time access is enforced.
  • Defender for Identity reports — Evidences on-premises Active Directory attack paths and identity threats that cloud identity data cannot show.
Entra sign-in logs and Entra ID Protection — risky users and detections were not in evidence catalogue v1.0, which defines the May–Oct 2026 assessments. They are approved in v2.0 (DS-30, DS-31) from the Nov 2026 assessment. No risky users, detections or compromises are reported — absence of telemetry is not evidence that none occurred.

Applications & service principals

Workload identity governance

Evidence-backed
Prioritised findings (7)
FindingSeverityCategoryMaterial risk
High-privilege delegated consent to unmanaged SaaS
14 third-party applications
HighHigh-privilege permissionsRL-116
Application can add credentials to any app
Automation runbooks (sp-automation-ops)
HighPrivileged service principalRL-116provisional
Directory write access held by legacy WMS sync
Legacy WMS sync (sp-wms-sync)
HighPrivileged service principalRL-103provisional
Admin consent granted without documented approval
41 admin consent grants
MediumAdmin consentUnlinked
Long-lived client secrets
11 app registrations
MediumCredential hygieneUnlinked
Applications without assigned owners
23 app registrations
MediumGovernanceUnlinked
Credentials expiring within 30 days
6 app registrations
LowCredential hygieneUnlinked

Identity attack paths

How identity weaknesses combine into material risk · no exploitation or compromise is claimed

Entry point
AitM phishing email
Credential and session-token phishing kit targeting administrators.
Precondition
Admin uses push / SMS MFA
CA003 accepts any MFA method; CA004 (phishing-resistant) is report-only.
Escalation
Token replay as Global Admin
Stolen session grants tenant-wide directory control.
Consequence
Tenant compromise
Mailbox access, backdoor app registrations, ransomware staging.

Hypothetical scenario constructed from observed preconditions. It is not a demonstrated or exploited path.

Business consequence

Loss of control of Microsoft 365; data theft and operational disruption across depots.

Recommended mitigation

Enforce phishing-resistant authentication strength for all privileged roles (A-1013, A-1014).

Supporting evidence
  • DS-01Secure Score recommended actionsComplete
  • DS-03Conditional Access policy exportPartial
Missing evidence
  • DS-04Entra MFA registration reportMissing
  • DS-05Privileged role inventoryMissing
  • Entra sign-in logs · DS-30, catalogue v2.0 — not collected

Priority identity remediation

Shared remediation records for identity-related material risks · 8 open · 3 outstanding evidence items

ActionRiskOwnerDueProgressCompletion evidence
Migrate APP-WMS-01 to resource-based constrained delegation
A-1033
RL-103Daniel Okafor10 Nov 26 In 10dNot yet due
Restrict user consent to verified publishers
A-1161
RL-116Marcus Bell12 Nov 26 In 12dNot yet due
Enrol remaining 24 privileged accounts in FIDO2
A-1013
RL-101Hannah Lewis14 Nov 26 In 14dNot yet due
Decommission APP-LEGACY-03 delegation and re-run path analysis
A-1034
RL-103Daniel Okafor15 Nov 26 In 15dNot yet due
Enforce phishing-resistant authentication strength via Conditional Access
A-1014
RL-101Hannah Lewis28 Nov 26 In 28dNot yet due
Convert standing Owner roles to PIM-eligible
A-1131
RL-113Marcus Bell30 Nov 26 In 30dNot yet due
Review and revoke unjustified high-privilege grants
A-1162
RL-116Marcus Bell18 Dec 26 In 48dNot yet due
Quarterly Azure RBAC access review
A-1132
RL-113Marcus Bell20 Dec 26 In 50dNot yet due
Validate WMS dependency on delegation with vendor
A-1032
RL-103Daniel Okafor30 Sept 26 DoneDocument referenced
Outstanding evidence:DS-05 Privileged role inventory · MissingDS-04 Entra MFA registration report · MissingDS-03 Conditional Access policy export · PartialEvidence & Uploads →

Management attention required

Most important identity decisions, exposures and gaps

  • DecisionRL-103
    Approve a WMS maintenance window for the delegation change (estimated 4 hours of downtime).
    Priya Shah · needed by 2026-11-07
  • ExposureRL-101
    12 Tier-0 identities without evidenced phishing-resistant MFA
    Assessor-reported — confirm with DS-04 and DS-05
  • Evidence gapRL-101
    Privileged role inventory missing
    DS-05 · 6 identity controls cannot be fully evidenced
  • Evidence gapRL-101
    Entra MFA registration report missing
    DS-04 · 2 identity controls cannot be fully evidenced
  • Evidence gapRL-101
    Conditional Access policy export incomplete (60% of scope)
    DS-03 · 7 identity controls cannot be fully evidenced

RiskLens · Demonstration build · Identities, policies and findings are fictional. “Evidence-backed” refers to simulated evidence and is not independent validation.