Monitoring & Coverage
What is monitored, whether telemetry arrives, whether detections and response are proven — and where the blind spots are. As at 31 Oct 2026 · compared with 30 Sept 2026
Monitoring coverage matrix
Five independent stages per target · a deployed agent does not imply connected, reporting, detecting or responding
Microsoft security capabilities
Seven independent dimensions · licensing is never inferred from an export being present · hover a status for its basis
No Microsoft Sentinel-based managed detection and response (MDR) service is evidenced. RL-107 references MSSP analysts; their scope is not recorded.
Live operational telemetry — log source connectivity
Connection from the Sentinel connector inventory (DS-18) · reporting health needs DS-19, which has never been collected
“Connected” means a connector is listed — not that data is arriving. No ingestion volume, latency or retention figure is shown because none is evidenced.
Periodic evidence exports
Governance freshness against catalogue cadence — never proof of continuous telemetry health
- DS-09Defender endpoint onboarding statusCollected 24 Oct 2026 · cadence 35dPartial
- DS-18Sentinel data connector inventoryCollected 24 Oct 2026 · cadence 35dComplete
- DS-19Log Analytics ingestion & retentionNever collectedMissing
- DS-15Defender XDR incident summaryCollected 26 Aug 2026 · cadence 35dStale
- DS-29Security incident registerCollected 29 Oct 2026 · cadence 35dComplete
- DS-28Cyber incident response planCollected 26 Sept 2026 · cadence 365dComplete
- DS-13Defender for Office 365 phish detectionsCollected 28 Oct 2026 · cadence 35dComplete
- DS-14Defender for Office 365 content malwareCollected 28 Oct 2026 · cadence 35dComplete
- DS-20Exchange Online protection policiesCollected 14 Aug 2026 · cadence 100dComplete
- DS-03Conditional Access policy exportCollected 22 Oct 2026 · cadence 35dPartial
Freshness thresholds
Per telemetry type — the basis for “Reporting”
- EDR sensor telemetry 7 days
- Matches the Endpoint Security 'reporting' definition (last seen ≤ 7 days).
- Identity sign-in and audit logs 24 hours
- Account compromise must be visible within a day.
- Server security events 24 hours
- Needed to investigate lateral movement.
- Firewall and network logs 1 hour
- Perimeter activity is time-critical.
- Azure Activity and diagnostic logs 24 hours
- Control-plane changes must be reviewable daily.
- Security alerts forwarded to the SIEM 1 hour
- Alerts must reach responders promptly.
- SaaS audit logs 24 hours
- Third-party application activity.
- Periodic evidence export Catalogue cadence (35 days)
- Governance evidence — never proof of continuous telemetry.
Shared register history: assessor observations before Aug 2026, DS-18 exports after. Each assessment uses its own value.
October 2026 assessment — Sentinel connector inventory (DS-18, 24 Oct 2026): 75 of 121 connected (62%).
- From 20 May 2026: Not measured — of 121 in-scope log sources not connected to Microsoft Sentinel
- From 24 Aug 2026: 46 of 121 in-scope log sources not connected to Microsoft Sentinel (38%)A-1071 · 12 Aug 2026 — Domain controllers (4) connected via AMA — they were not connected before this date
- From 24 Sept 2026: 46 of 121 in-scope log sources not connected to Microsoft Sentinel (38%)
- From 24 Oct 2026: 46 of 121 in-scope log sources not connected to Microsoft Sentinel (38%)In force
Detection use cases
Configured logic and validation are tracked separately · MITRE references only where the scenario supports one · response owner for all: Security Operations (Sofia Romero) with MSSP analysts — routing not verified
- Detections validated by test
- Not assessed — 0 of 13 have test evidence
- Logic configured or product-native (untested)
- 4 of 13
- Response tested by exercise or operational event
- Not assessed · overdue Not exercised in 18 months (RL-112) — validation overdue, not a failed exercise. The executive tabletop (A-1122) is due 19 Nov 2026.
A detection counts as validated only with a recorded test. Response counts as tested only with an exercise or a documented operational incident.
Not in the remediation register — no owner or due date is assigned.
- CAND-MON-01Run detection validation tests for priority use cases (DUC-01, DUC-04, DUC-07, DUC-08)No use case has recorded test evidence.
- CAND-MON-02Verify end-to-end alert routing from Sentinel to the MSSP and on-call respondersAlert routing has never been tested.
- CAND-MON-03Obtain the MSSP contract SLA schedule and monthly service reportsRL-107 refers to “MSSP contract SLAs” — an unvalidated assessor reference; no terms or performance are recorded.
SOC / MDR operational assurance
Twelve criteria, each on its own evidence · no 24/7 coverage, provider or SLA performance is assumed
- SOC-01Monitoring hoursNot assessed
Not recorded. No 24/7 coverage is claimed.
Evidence needed: MSSP contract or service description stating monitored hours.
- SOC-02Alert ownershipAssessor
Security Operations Lead owns RL-107 and SIEM operations; MSSP analysts referenced.
Evidence needed: RACI for alert handling between internal team and MSSP. · RL-107
- SOC-03Escalation processVerified
Defined in the updated incident response plan (A-1121, DS-28).
Evidence needed: Current incident response plan (DS-28).
- SOC-04Incident severity modelVerified
Severity levels defined in the updated plan (DS-28).
Evidence needed: Current incident response plan (DS-28).
- SOC-05First-response SLANot assessed
Contractual SLA terms are not recorded (RL-107 refers to 'MSSP contract SLAs' only).
Evidence needed: MSSP contract SLA schedule (proposed DS-49).
- SOC-06Alert triageNot assessed
Triage timeliness is not in the XDR incident summary (DS-15).
Evidence needed: Incident timestamps: alert, triage, escalation (proposed DS-50).
- SOC-07Incident escalation recordsPartial
An incident register is maintained (DS-29); escalation timing is not recorded.
Evidence needed: Incident register with escalation timestamps.
- SOC-08Containment authorityPartial
Defined in the updated plan; MSSP authority to isolate devices is not documented.
Evidence needed: Documented MSSP containment authority.
- SOC-09Incident response integrationPartial
Plan updated for the cloud-first estate (A-1121); MSSP hand-offs not evidenced.
Evidence needed: Plan sections covering MSSP hand-off.
- SOC-10Playbook coverageNot assessed
No playbook or automation export (proposed DS-50).
Evidence needed: Sentinel automation and playbook inventory.
- SOC-11Tabletop exerciseNot assessed · overdue
Not exercised in 18 months (RL-112) — validation overdue, not a failed exercise. The executive tabletop (A-1122) is due 19 Nov 2026.
Evidence needed: Exercise report (A-1122). · RL-112
- SOC-12Reporting cadencePartial
Monthly incident register exports from Aug (DS-29); MSSP service reports not evidenced.
Evidence needed: MSSP monthly service reports (proposed DS-49).
- Internal
- Security Operations Lead (Sofia Romero) — owner of RL-107
- External
- Managed security service provider (MSSP) — referenced in RL-107 ('SOC analysts (MSSP)', 'MSSP contract SLAs'), an unvalidated assessor reference. Provider name, contract, scope and hours are not recorded.
The model supports internal, external or hybrid operations. Assessor-reported from RL-107; no contract has been collected.
Preserved as recorded. No MSSP contract, contractual SLA schedule or SLA performance report has been collected, so neither the contract, its SLA terms nor any measured SLA performance is independently verified. The provider is not named.
Recorded in: RL-107 treatment rationale (25 May 2026); identities list “SOC analysts (MSSP)”. Validating it requires DS-49 SOC/MDR contract SLA schedule and service reports (proposed, catalogue v5.0).
- Contractual SLA Not assessed
RL-107 refers to “MSSP contract SLAs” — an unvalidated assessor reference. No contract or SLA schedule has been collected.
- Reported SLA performance Not assessed
No MSSP service report has been collected.
- Independently verified SLA performance Not assessed
No incident timestamps to verify against.
Blind-spot register
9 open at this assessment · stable IDs · built from existing findings · missing evidence is not treated as confirmed absence
Attack-path detection coverage
Existing paths only — statuses and verified disruption are unchanged · an installed agent does not make a step detectable · Exposure & Attack Paths →
Monitoring history — May to October 2026
Genuine coverage improvements are separated from newly collected evidence, which changes what can be measured — not the coverage itself
Critical blind spots rise from May to Aug because new exports (DS-18 in Aug) made existing gaps measurable — not because monitoring worsened. Servers without EDR fell 49 → 31 after A-1041 (29 Jul), a genuine improvement.
Management attention
What needs a decision · no regulatory or monitoring-failure claims
Not material risks — queued for management to assess. No risk is created automatically.
- MRQ-07UnlinkedNo decision date setPrivileged workload identities without activity visibilitymi-automation (Owner on sub-prod-shared, named in MDC-14 from Jul 2026), SP-03 (Application.ReadWrite.All) and SP-05 (Directory.ReadWrite.All, DS-25 from 22 Oct 2026) hold Tier-0-equivalent permissions. Their sign-in and activity logs are not evidenced, so credential abuse would not be visible.Awaiting materiality assessment · queued 13 Nov 2026 · decision owner Tom Whitfield
Remediation actions
Shared register records for RL-104, RL-107 and RL-112 · 5 open · 0 overdue
Builds on the proposed v4.0 (46 datasets / 113 controls) → 50 datasets / 116 controls. Proposed effective 1 Apr 2027, prospectively. v1.0–v3.0 and the v4.0 proposal are unchanged; Evidence Coverage and the Cyber Risk Index are not restated.
- DS-47Sentinel analytics rules and automation inventory
- DS-48Detection validation test results
- DS-49SOC/MDR contract SLA schedule and service reports
- DS-50Sentinel incident and alert-routing records
- LOG-10Priority detection use cases validated by testing
- OPS-08SOC/MDR SLA performance reported and reviewed
- OPS-09Alert routing to responders verified
RiskLens · Demonstration build · Monitoring status is built from existing synthetic records. “Verified” and “Evidence-backed” refer to simulated evidence, not independent validation.