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Halcyon Freight GroupDEMO

Monitoring & Coverage

What is monitored, whether telemetry arrives, whether detections and response are proven — and where the blind spots are. As at 31 Oct 2026 · compared with 30 Sept 2026

DEMO data. No live telemetry is ingested; no detection test or SLA is invented.

Monitoring coverage matrix

Five independent stages per target · a deployed agent does not imply connected, reporting, detecting or responding

14 of 14 targets
TargetDeployedConnectedReportingDetectingRespondingConfidenceRisks
Low
Medium
Medium
—
Low
—
Low
Low
—
Low
—
Medium
—
None
Low
None
—
Low
None
—
Low
VerifiedRequirement met and evidenced by an accepted catalogue dataset (synthetic demonstration export).
PartialMet for part of the scope, or only point-in-time evidence.
AssessorStated in an assessor or register record; not dataset-evidenced.
Not assessedNo evidence either way — says nothing about whether monitoring works.
Not assessed · overdueThe required test or exercise has not occurred within its period (e.g. RL-112). Not a failed test.
FailedEvidence shows the requirement is not met — a connector recorded as not connected, a disabled policy, or an actual unsuccessful test or operational response. Never used for a missing exercise.
N/AThe stage does not apply to this target.

Microsoft security capabilities

Seven independent dimensions · licensing is never inferred from an export being present · hover a status for its basis

CapabilityLicensing / planConfigurationScope of protectionTelemetry availabilityDetection configurationAlert routingResponse ownership
MDEMicrosoft Defender for Endpoint
Not assessedNo licence inventory — licensing is never inferred from an export being present.
PartialOnboarding evidenced (DS-09); antivirus mode and tamper protection not evidenced (v3.0 DS-34).
Partial1344 of 1401 devices onboarded (servers outside the export are assessor-reported).
PartialLast-seen dates in the monthly DS-09 snapshot — point-in-time, not continuous.
Not assessedNo analytics-rule or policy export (proposed DS-47); no detection is validated.
PartialConnector Defender XDR alerts and incidents listed as connected in DS-18 (2026-10-24); delivery to responders not verified.
AssessorSecurity Operations Lead with MSSP analysts (RL-107 — unvalidated assessor reference); RACI not evidenced.
MDIMicrosoft Defender for Identity
Not assessedNo licence inventory — licensing is never inferred from an export being present.
Not assessedNo Defender for Identity export (DS-33, catalogue v2.0) — deployment status unknown.
Not assessedSensor coverage of domain controllers not evidenced.
Not assessedNot evidenced.
Not assessedNot evidenced.
Not assessedNot evidenced.
AssessorSecurity Operations Lead with MSSP analysts (RL-107 — unvalidated assessor reference); RACI not evidenced.
MDOMicrosoft Defender for Office 365
Not assessedNo licence inventory — licensing is never inferred from an export being present.
VerifiedProtection policies exported (DS-20).
PartialExchange Online evidenced; Teams and SharePoint attachment scanning not evidenced.
PartialMonthly phishing and malware detection exports (DS-13, DS-14) — periodic, not live.
PartialProduct-native detections occur (DS-13/14); custom rules and tests not evidenced.
PartialConnector Defender XDR alerts and incidents listed as connected in DS-18 (2026-10-24); delivery to responders not verified.
AssessorSecurity Operations Lead with MSSP analysts (RL-107 — unvalidated assessor reference); RACI not evidenced.
MDCMicrosoft Defender for Cloud
PartialPlan state inferred from 'should be enabled' recommendations (DS-10) — not licence evidence.
PartialRecommendations exported monthly (DS-10).
Partial83 of 99 plan-eligible resources covered by a Defender plan.
PartialConnector Defender for Cloud alerts listed as connected in DS-18 (2026-10-24); delivery to responders not verified.
Not assessedNo analytics-rule or policy export (proposed DS-47); no detection is validated.
PartialConnector Defender for Cloud alerts listed as connected in DS-18 (2026-10-24); delivery to responders not verified.
AssessorCloud Engineering (Marcus Bell) for findings; Security Operations for alerts.
MDCAMicrosoft Defender for Cloud Apps
Not assessedNo licence inventory — licensing is never inferred from an export being present.
Not assessedNo evidence of deployment — status unknown, not assumed absent.
Not assessedNot evidenced.
Not assessedNot evidenced.
Not assessedNot evidenced.
Not assessedNot evidenced.
Not assessedNot recorded.
IDPMicrosoft Entra ID Protection
Not assessedEntra ID P2 assignment not evidenced (DS-31, catalogue v2.0, not collected).
FailedRisk-based Conditional Access policies CA008 and CA009 are disabled (DS-03).
Not assessedNot evidenced.
Not assessedRisk detections not exported (DS-31).
Not assessedNot evidenced.
Not assessedNot evidenced.
Not assessedNot recorded.
SENMicrosoft Sentinel
Not assessedNo licence inventory — licensing is never inferred from an export being present.
VerifiedConnector inventory exported (DS-18, 2026-10-24).
Partial75 of 121 in-scope log sources connected (62%, DS-18 2026-10-24).
Not assessedIngestion health not evidenced (DS-19).
Not assessedNo analytics-rule or policy export (proposed DS-47); no detection is validated.
Not assessedIncident assignment and routing not exported (proposed DS-50).
AssessorSecurity Operations Lead with MSSP analysts (RL-107 — unvalidated assessor reference); RACI not evidenced.
AMAAzure Monitor (Azure Monitor Agent)
N/AConsumption-based; no licence.
PartialWindows VMs and head-office servers connected; Linux VMs not (LS-13); domain controllers from 12 Aug (A-1071).
Partial25 Linux Azure VMs without AMA log collection.
Not assessedAgent heartbeat not evidenced (DS-19).
N/ACollection only — detection happens in Sentinel.
N/ACollection only.
AssessorSecurity Operations Lead with MSSP analysts (RL-107 — unvalidated assessor reference); RACI not evidenced.
LAWLog Analytics workspace
N/AConsumption-based.
Not assessedWorkspace settings not exported (DS-19).
Not assessedNot evidenced.
Not assessedIngestion volume and latency are not recorded — none is shown.
N/AStorage layer.
N/AStorage layer.
AssessorSecurity Operations Lead with MSSP analysts (RL-107 — unvalidated assessor reference); RACI not evidenced.
M365Microsoft 365 audit logging
Not assessedNo licence inventory — licensing is never inferred from an export being present.
Not assessedUnified audit log status not exported (LOG-07 needs DS-19).
PartialExchange, SharePoint and Teams audit sources in the inventory.
PartialConnector Microsoft 365 audit (Exchange, SharePoint, Teams) listed as connected in DS-18 (2026-10-24); delivery to responders not verified.
Not assessedNo analytics-rule or policy export (proposed DS-47); no detection is validated.
PartialConnector Microsoft 365 audit (Exchange, SharePoint, Teams) listed as connected in DS-18 (2026-10-24); delivery to responders not verified.
AssessorSecurity Operations Lead with MSSP analysts (RL-107 — unvalidated assessor reference); RACI not evidenced.

No Microsoft Sentinel-based managed detection and response (MDR) service is evidenced. RL-107 references MSSP analysts; their scope is not recorded.

Live operational telemetry — log source connectivity

Connection from the Sentinel connector inventory (DS-18) · reporting health needs DS-19, which has never been collected

62% connected75 of 121 sources · Oct 2026 assessment (DS-18, 24 Oct 2026)
SourceCountConnectedThresholdReportingRisk
1Verified1 hourNot assessed—
2Verified24 hoursNot assessed—
3Verified24 hoursNot assessed—
5Verified24 hoursNot assessed—
1Verified1 hourNot assessed—
4Verified24 hoursNot assessedRL-107
4Verified1 hourNot assessed—
18Verified24 hoursNot assessed—
35Verified24 hoursNot assessed—
2Verified24 hoursNot assessed—
18Failed1 hourNot assessedRL-107
1Failed24 hoursNot assessedRL-107
25Failed24 hoursNot assessedRL-107
2Failed24 hoursNot assessedRL-107

“Connected” means a connector is listed — not that data is arriving. No ingestion volume, latency or retention figure is shown because none is evidenced.

Periodic evidence exports

Governance freshness against catalogue cadence — never proof of continuous telemetry health

  • DS-09Defender endpoint onboarding statusCollected 24 Oct 2026 · cadence 35dPartial
  • DS-18Sentinel data connector inventoryCollected 24 Oct 2026 · cadence 35dComplete
  • DS-19Log Analytics ingestion & retentionNever collectedMissing
  • DS-15Defender XDR incident summaryCollected 26 Aug 2026 · cadence 35dStale
  • DS-29Security incident registerCollected 29 Oct 2026 · cadence 35dComplete
  • DS-28Cyber incident response planCollected 26 Sept 2026 · cadence 365dComplete
  • DS-13Defender for Office 365 phish detectionsCollected 28 Oct 2026 · cadence 35dComplete
  • DS-14Defender for Office 365 content malwareCollected 28 Oct 2026 · cadence 35dComplete
  • DS-20Exchange Online protection policiesCollected 14 Aug 2026 · cadence 100dComplete
  • DS-03Conditional Access policy exportCollected 22 Oct 2026 · cadence 35dPartial

Freshness thresholds

Per telemetry type — the basis for “Reporting”

EDR sensor telemetry 7 days
Matches the Endpoint Security 'reporting' definition (last seen ≤ 7 days).
Identity sign-in and audit logs 24 hours
Account compromise must be visible within a day.
Server security events 24 hours
Needed to investigate lateral movement.
Firewall and network logs 1 hour
Perimeter activity is time-critical.
Azure Activity and diagnostic logs 24 hours
Control-plane changes must be reviewable daily.
Security alerts forwarded to the SIEM 1 hour
Alerts must reach responders promptly.
SaaS audit logs 24 hours
Third-party application activity.
Periodic evidence export Catalogue cadence (35 days)
Governance evidence — never proof of continuous telemetry.
RL-107 — dated log-source measurements

Shared register history: assessor observations before Aug 2026, DS-18 exports after. Each assessment uses its own value.

46 of 121 in-scope log sources not connected to Microsoft Sentinel (38%)as at 31 Oct 2026Evidence-backed
Depot firewalls 18Azure Linux VM syslog 25SaaS audit 2WMS audit 1

October 2026 assessment — Sentinel connector inventory (DS-18, 24 Oct 2026): 75 of 121 connected (62%).

  1. From 20 May 2026: Not measured — of 121 in-scope log sources not connected to Microsoft Sentinel
  2. From 24 Aug 2026: 46 of 121 in-scope log sources not connected to Microsoft Sentinel (38%)A-1071 · 12 Aug 2026 — Domain controllers (4) connected via AMA — they were not connected before this date
  3. From 24 Sept 2026: 46 of 121 in-scope log sources not connected to Microsoft Sentinel (38%)
  4. From 24 Oct 2026: 46 of 121 in-scope log sources not connected to Microsoft Sentinel (38%)In force

Detection use cases

Configured logic and validation are tracked separately · MITRE references only where the scenario supports one · response owner for all: Security Operations (Sofia Romero) with MSSP analysts — routing not verified

Use caseMITRE ATT&CKLogicValidationLast testAlert destinationRisks
T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud AccountsNot assessedNot assessedNoneMicrosoft Sentinel
T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud AccountsFailedNot assessedNoneEntra ID Protection (not evidenced)
Not mappedNot assessedNot assessedNoneNot established
T1621Multi-Factor Authentication Request GenerationNot assessedNot assessedNoneMicrosoft Sentinel
T1003OS Credential DumpingPartialNot assessedNoneDefender XDR → Sentinel
Not mappedPartialNot assessedNoneDefender XDR → Sentinel
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactPartialNot assessedNoneDefender XDR → Sentinel
T1021Remote ServicesNot assessedNot assessedNoneNot established
Not mappedNot assessedNot assessedNoneMicrosoft Sentinel
T1528Steal Application Access TokenNot assessedNot assessedNoneNot established
T1578Modify Cloud Compute InfrastructureNot assessedNot assessedNoneMicrosoft Sentinel
T1530Data from Cloud StoragePartialNot assessedNoneDefender for Cloud → Sentinel
T1098.001Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud CredentialsNot assessedNot assessedNoneNot established
—
Monitoring effectiveness
Detections validated by test
Not assessed — 0 of 13 have test evidence
Logic configured or product-native (untested)
4 of 13
Response tested by exercise or operational event
Not assessed · overdue Not exercised in 18 months (RL-112) — validation overdue, not a failed exercise. The executive tabletop (A-1122) is due 19 Nov 2026.

A detection counts as validated only with a recorded test. Response counts as tested only with an exercise or a documented operational incident.

Candidate validation actions

Not in the remediation register — no owner or due date is assigned.

  • CAND-MON-01Run detection validation tests for priority use cases (DUC-01, DUC-04, DUC-07, DUC-08)No use case has recorded test evidence.
  • CAND-MON-02Verify end-to-end alert routing from Sentinel to the MSSP and on-call respondersAlert routing has never been tested.
  • CAND-MON-03Obtain the MSSP contract SLA schedule and monthly service reportsRL-107 refers to “MSSP contract SLAs” — an unvalidated assessor reference; no terms or performance are recorded.

SOC / MDR operational assurance

Twelve criteria, each on its own evidence · no 24/7 coverage, provider or SLA performance is assumed

  • SOC-01Monitoring hoursNot assessed

    Not recorded. No 24/7 coverage is claimed.

    Evidence needed: MSSP contract or service description stating monitored hours.

  • SOC-02Alert ownershipAssessor

    Security Operations Lead owns RL-107 and SIEM operations; MSSP analysts referenced.

    Evidence needed: RACI for alert handling between internal team and MSSP. · RL-107

  • SOC-03Escalation processVerified

    Defined in the updated incident response plan (A-1121, DS-28).

    Evidence needed: Current incident response plan (DS-28).

  • SOC-04Incident severity modelVerified

    Severity levels defined in the updated plan (DS-28).

    Evidence needed: Current incident response plan (DS-28).

  • SOC-05First-response SLANot assessed

    Contractual SLA terms are not recorded (RL-107 refers to 'MSSP contract SLAs' only).

    Evidence needed: MSSP contract SLA schedule (proposed DS-49).

  • SOC-06Alert triageNot assessed

    Triage timeliness is not in the XDR incident summary (DS-15).

    Evidence needed: Incident timestamps: alert, triage, escalation (proposed DS-50).

  • SOC-07Incident escalation recordsPartial

    An incident register is maintained (DS-29); escalation timing is not recorded.

    Evidence needed: Incident register with escalation timestamps.

  • SOC-08Containment authorityPartial

    Defined in the updated plan; MSSP authority to isolate devices is not documented.

    Evidence needed: Documented MSSP containment authority.

  • SOC-09Incident response integrationPartial

    Plan updated for the cloud-first estate (A-1121); MSSP hand-offs not evidenced.

    Evidence needed: Plan sections covering MSSP hand-off.

  • SOC-10Playbook coverageNot assessed

    No playbook or automation export (proposed DS-50).

    Evidence needed: Sentinel automation and playbook inventory.

  • SOC-11Tabletop exerciseNot assessed · overdue

    Not exercised in 18 months (RL-112) — validation overdue, not a failed exercise. The executive tabletop (A-1122) is due 19 Nov 2026.

    Evidence needed: Exercise report (A-1122). · RL-112

  • SOC-12Reporting cadencePartial

    Monthly incident register exports from Aug (DS-29); MSSP service reports not evidenced.

    Evidence needed: MSSP monthly service reports (proposed DS-49).

Operating modelHybrid
Internal
Security Operations Lead (Sofia Romero) — owner of RL-107
External
Managed security service provider (MSSP) — referenced in RL-107 ('SOC analysts (MSSP)', 'MSSP contract SLAs'), an unvalidated assessor reference. Provider name, contract, scope and hours are not recorded.

The model supports internal, external or hybrid operations. Assessor-reported from RL-107; no contract has been collected.

“MSSP contract SLAs”Unvalidated assessor reference

Preserved as recorded. No MSSP contract, contractual SLA schedule or SLA performance report has been collected, so neither the contract, its SLA terms nor any measured SLA performance is independently verified. The provider is not named.

Recorded in: RL-107 treatment rationale (25 May 2026); identities list “SOC analysts (MSSP)”. Validating it requires DS-49 SOC/MDR contract SLA schedule and service reports (proposed, catalogue v5.0).

Response SLA — three separate levels
  • Contractual SLA Not assessed

    RL-107 refers to “MSSP contract SLAs” — an unvalidated assessor reference. No contract or SLA schedule has been collected.

  • Reported SLA performance Not assessed

    No MSSP service report has been collected.

  • Independently verified SLA performance Not assessed

    No incident timestamps to verify against.

Blind-spot register

9 open at this assessment · stable IDs · built from existing findings · missing evidence is not treated as confirmed absence

Blind spotStageCriticalityAffectedEvidenceStatus · ownerRisk
DeployedBusiness critical31 of 221 serversAssessorRemediation in progress — A-1042, A-1043Daniel OkaforRL-104
DetectingBusiness critical57 devices without EDR (incl. 31 servers)AssessorRemediation in progress — A-1042, A-1043Daniel OkaforRL-104
ConnectedBusiness critical18 source(s): 18 depot sitesEvidenceRemediation in progress — A-1072Sofia RomeroRL-107
ConnectedBusiness critical1 source(s): Warehouse management systemEvidenceRemediation in progress — A-1073Sofia RomeroRL-107
ConnectedBusiness critical25 source(s): AZ-LNX VMsEvidenceOpen — no register actionSofia RomeroRL-107
ConnectedBusiness criticalkv-integration-prod, kv-dev, app-portal-api, app-tracking-public, func-notificationsEvidenceOpen — no register actionSofia RomeroRL-107provisional
DetectingTier-038 privileged role holders (RL-101)AssessorRemediation in progress — A-1014Hannah LewisRL-101
ConnectedTier-0mi-automation, Automation runbooks (sp-automation-ops), Legacy WMS sync (sp-wms-sync)PartialQueued for materiality review (MRQ-07)Tom WhitfieldMRQ-07
ReportingBusiness criticalHQ-RDG-01, AZ-LNX-16PartialOpen — no register actionOwner not recordedRL-104provisional

Attack-path detection coverage

Existing paths only — statuses and verified disruption are unchanged · an installed agent does not make a step detectable · Exposure & Attack Paths →

PathExposure statusUnmonitored stepsPreventionDetectionContainmentRecoveryOwner
Hypothetical scenario0 / 4A-1014DUC-01, DUC-02, DUC-04 — not validatedNo containment capability evidencedNot assessedHannah Lewis
Hypothetical scenario0 / 4A-1162DUC-10 — not validatedNo containment capability evidencedNot assessedMarcus Bell
Assessor-inferred1 / 5A-1033, A-1034DUC-05, DUC-07, DUC-08, DUC-09 — not validatedEDR device isolation available — not testedNot assessedDaniel Okafor
Remediated with verification0 / 4—No use caseNo containment capability evidencedNot assessedHannah Lewis
Assessor-inferred1 / 3CAND-1009No use caseEDR device isolation available — not testedNot assessedDaniel Okafor
Hypothetical scenario1 / 5CAND-EXP-2, A-1093DUC-05, DUC-08 — not validatedEDR device isolation available — not testedNot assessedDaniel Okafor
Hypothetical scenario2 / 3CAND-CA005No use caseNo containment capability evidencedNot assessedSecurity Operations (Sofia Romero)
Remediated with verification1 / 4—DUC-12 — not validatedNo containment capability evidencedNot assessedMarcus Bell
Hypothetical scenario2 / 4CAND-MDC-05DUC-12 — not validatedNo containment capability evidencedNot assessedSecurity Operations (Sofia Romero)
Hypothetical scenario1 / 4CAND-MDC-03No use caseEDR device isolation available — not testedNot assessedSecurity Operations (Sofia Romero)
Hypothetical scenario0 / 4A-1014, A-1131DUC-01, DUC-04, DUC-09, DUC-11 — not validatedNo containment capability evidencedNot assessedMarcus Bell
No longer observed0 / 4—No use caseEDR device isolation available — not testedNot assessedSecurity Operations (Sofia Romero)
Hypothetical scenario1 / 4A-1131, CAND-CA011DUC-09, DUC-11 — not validatedNo containment capability evidencedNot assessedMarcus Bell

Monitoring history — May to October 2026

Genuine coverage improvements are separated from newly collected evidence, which changes what can be measured — not the coverage itself

MonthLog source connectivityServers without EDRCritical blind spotsValidated detectionsSOC verifiedEvents in the month
MayNot assessed497Not assessed0No change recorded
JunNot assessed497Not assessed0
  • New evidence24 JunDefender onboarding export (DS-09) first collected
JulNot assessed318Not assessed0
  • Coverage improvement29 JulA-1041 — 18 head-office servers onboarded to Defender for Endpoint (RL-104)
Aug62%319Not assessed0
  • Coverage improvement12 AugA-1071 — domain controllers connected to Sentinel via AMA (RL-107)
  • Coverage improvement14 Augapp-portal-prod diagnostic logs enabled (MDC-11 healthy)
  • New evidence24 AugSentinel connector inventory (DS-18) first collected
  • New evidence29 AugIncident register (DS-29) first collected
Sep62%319Not assessed2
  • New evidence26 SeptUpdated incident response plan collected (DS-28)
  • Process improvement26 SeptA-1121 — incident response plan updated for the cloud-first estate (RL-112)
Oct62%319Not assessed2
  • New evidence22 OctApp registration credentials (DS-25) first collected

Critical blind spots rise from May to Aug because new exports (DS-18 in Aug) made existing gaps measurable — not because monitoring worsened. Servers without EDR fell 49 → 31 after A-1041 (29 Jul), a genuine improvement.

Management attention

What needs a decision · no regulatory or monitoring-failure claims

Outstanding decisions (1)
RL-107Approve the increased Sentinel ingestion budget (approx. £38k a year) for depot firewall logs.
Decision owner Priya Shah · needed by 20 Nov 2026 (20 days) · open RL-107
Materiality review queue (1)

Not material risks — queued for management to assess. No risk is created automatically.

  • MRQ-07UnlinkedNo decision date set
    Privileged workload identities without activity visibility
    mi-automation (Owner on sub-prod-shared, named in MDC-14 from Jul 2026), SP-03 (Application.ReadWrite.All) and SP-05 (Directory.ReadWrite.All, DS-25 from 22 Oct 2026) hold Tier-0-equivalent permissions. Their sign-in and activity logs are not evidenced, so credential abuse would not be visible.
    Awaiting materiality assessment · queued 13 Nov 2026 · decision owner Tom Whitfield

Remediation actions

Shared register records for RL-104, RL-107 and RL-112 · 5 open · 0 overdue

ActionRiskOwnerDueStatus
Run executive ransomware tabletop exercise
A-1122
RL-112Tom Whitfield19 Nov 26 In 19d
Onboard depot file servers (12)
A-1042
RL-104Daniel Okafor21 Nov 26 In 21d
Onboard depot firewall syslog (18 sources)
A-1072
RL-107Sofia Romero30 Nov 26 In 30d
Onboard WMS and print servers (19)
A-1043
RL-104Daniel Okafor15 Dec 26 In 45d
Build WMS audit log parser and analytics rules
A-1073
RL-107Sofia Romero31 Jan 27 In 92d
Proposed evidence catalogue v5.0 — preview onlyNot approved · not applied

Builds on the proposed v4.0 (46 datasets / 113 controls) → 50 datasets / 116 controls. Proposed effective 1 Apr 2027, prospectively. v1.0–v3.0 and the v4.0 proposal are unchanged; Evidence Coverage and the Cyber Risk Index are not restated.

  • DS-47Sentinel analytics rules and automation inventory
  • DS-48Detection validation test results
  • DS-49SOC/MDR contract SLA schedule and service reports
  • DS-50Sentinel incident and alert-routing records
  • LOG-10Priority detection use cases validated by testing
  • OPS-08SOC/MDR SLA performance reported and reviewed
  • OPS-09Alert routing to responders verified

RiskLens · Demonstration build · Monitoring status is built from existing synthetic records. “Verified” and “Evidence-backed” refer to simulated evidence, not independent validation.