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Halcyon Freight GroupDEMO

Exposure & Attack Paths

How weaknesses combine into potential routes to business-critical assets, and which remediation breaks the most. As at 31 Oct 2026 · compared with 30 Sept 2026

DEMO data. No path is tool-confirmed and no exploitation is claimed.
Evidence-backedPartial evidenceAssessor-reportedNot assessed

Attack-path graph

One path at a time — entry point → weakness → privilege or movement → critical asset → inferred business impact

IAP-3Unconstrained delegation → domain compromiseAssessor-inferredCritical
Entry pointWeaknessPrivilege or movementCritical assetBusiness impactENDDomain-joined workstations(1,180)ENDCRITICALAPP-WMS-01ENDCRITICALAPP-LEGACY-03PRVActive Directory DomainAdminsBCACRITICALDomain controllers (4)INFERRED — NOT A TECHNICAL LINKFull Active Directorycompromise; depot operationshalted.
Observed in a catalogue datasetAssessor-reportedAssumed (hypothetical)Not present at this dateDashed node border = assumed node · CRITICAL = business-critical asset · codes: NET END IDN PRV VUL CFG DAT BCA
Identity & Access · first observed 30 Jun · last 31 Oct · RL-103

Attack-path register

Every path keeps its source record ID · “No longer observed” is never treated as remediated

13 of 13 paths
PathEntry pointPrimary weaknessTarget assetPotential business impactSeverityEvidenceSourceFirst observedLast observedStatusRisk
Domain-joined workstations (1,180)APP-WMS-01, APP-LEGACY-03Domain controllers (4)Full Active Directory compromise; depot operations halted.CriticalAssessorIdentity & Access30 Jun 2631 Oct 26Assessor-inferred
HQ-RDG-01DEMO-CVE-2026-1009 RD Gateway RCE, EDR sensor impaired on HQ-RDG-01Not evidencedRemote foothold on a head-office server with limited detection — onward movement is not evidenced.HighAssessorEndpoint Security31 Aug 2631 Oct 26Assessor-inferred
Engineers holding standing Owner (9 user accounts)Azure management accepts any MFA methodProduction subscriptions (4)Extended outage of the customer portal, EDI and data services.CriticalAssessorCloud Security31 Aug 2631 Oct 26Hypothetical
DEPOT-FS-LEG-01, WMS-LEG-01DEMO-CVE-2026-1002 Server 2012 R2 — no updates without ESUDomain controllers (4)Unpatchable vulnerability used to harvest privileged credentials and reach Tier-0.CriticalAssessorEndpoint Security30 Jun 2631 Oct 26Hypothetical
Privileged Entra administratorsCA003 accepts any MFA method for adminsMicrosoft 365 tenantLoss of control of Microsoft 365; data theft and operational disruption across depots.CriticalAssessorIdentity & Access31 May 2631 Oct 26Hypothetical
Administrator workstations (not identified)Admin sign-in frequency not enforcedProduction subscriptions (4)Production cloud infrastructure changed or destroyed from a compromised endpoint.CriticalAssessorExposure (cross-domain)31 Aug 2631 Oct 26Hypothetical
sql-wms-reportingSQL firewall allows all IP addressesShipment and customer delivery dataCustomer personal data exposure and loss of WMS reporting integrity.HighAssessorCloud Security30 Jun 2631 Oct 26Hypothetical
UnlinkedMRQ-03
AZ-LNX-16SSH open to the internetsub-prod-data subscriptionA non-production compromise becomes a production data exposure.HighAssessorCloud Security31 Aug 2631 Oct 26Hypothetical
UnlinkedMRQ-05
Third-party SaaS applications (14)User consent without admin reviewExecutive mailboxes and finance filesConfidential commercial data exposed; regulatory notification likely.HighAssessorIdentity & Access31 Oct 2631 Oct 26Hypothetical
Workstations not enrolled in Intune (22)Compliant-device policy covers Microsoft 365 onlyFinance applicationSensitive finance data accessed from devices with unknown security posture.MediumAssessorEndpoint Security30 Sept 2631 Oct 26Hypothetical
UnlinkedMRQ-06
AZ-WEB-02RDP open to the internetsql-portal-prodCustomer portal account data exposure.HighPartialCloud Security31 May 2631 Jul 26No longer observed
Unlinked
stmanifestsprod, stediarchiveAnonymous read on 'manifests' containersCustomer contact details (shipment manifests)Personal data exposure reportable to the ICO; contractual breach with retail customers.HighEvidenceCloud Security——Remediated — verified
Exchange Online IMAP / SMTP AUTHLegacy authentication not blockedSupplier payment communicationsFinancial fraud and reputational damage with suppliers.HighPartialIdentity & Access31 May 2631 Jul 26Remediated — verified

Remediation choke points

Ranked by severity × evidence of paths interrupted, critical assets protected and feasibility — not by raw path count

ActionOwner · duePathsRisksScoreSimulate
Hannah Lewis
28 Nov 26
IAP-1, CAP-43.1
Marcus Bell
30 Nov 26
CAP-4, XAP-13.1
Marcus Bell
No target date
CAP-3
Unlinked
1.8
Marcus Bell
No target date
CAP-2
Unlinked
1.8
Marcus Bell
18 Dec 26
IAP-21.6
Not assigned
No target date
EXP-3
Unlinked
1.3
Not assigned
No target date
XAP-1
Unlinked
1.2
Not assigned
No target date
EXP-21.2
Daniel Okafor
10 Nov 26
None alone
Partial: IAP-3
0
Daniel Okafor
15 Nov 26
None alone
Partial: IAP-3
0
Daniel Okafor
28 Feb 27
None alone
Partial: EXP-2
0
Not assigned
No target date
None alone
Partial: EXP-1
Unlinked
0

Score = (Σ severity weight × evidence weight of paths interrupted on its own + 1 per business-critical asset no longer reachable) × feasibility. Candidate recommendations are not approved remediation and have no target date. Actions needing a partner action to break a path (e.g. A-1033 with A-1034) show as partial.

What-if remediation simulation

Illustrative remediation scenario — not a verified security outcome.

Selected: none — tick actions in the choke-point table

Interrupted
0
Partially affected
0
Unaffected
10
Critical remaining
5
Paths potentially interrupted
  • None.
Business-critical assets potentially protected

None — every critical target is still reachable by a remaining path.

Assumptions and evidence limitations
  • Each selected action is assumed fully effective and removes exactly the relationships listed for it.
  • Only paths in the shared graph are tested; routes not modelled (no attack-path export) are unknown.
  • Hypothetical and assessor-reported relationships are treated as present — the result is no stronger than that evidence.
  • Nothing here changes risk status, remediation records, historical snapshots or the Cyber Risk Index.

Asset exposure register

Cloud and endpoint assets in one register — 4 Azure VMs matched to their endpoint record by asset ID (never by name); populations that cannot be resolved stay separate

109 of 109 assets
AssetTypeCriticalityInternet exposureKnown vulnerabilitiesEDRIdentity permissionsMonitoringPathsRisk
Endpoint + Azure — one record
Azure VM (server)Business criticalReachable (tested)0 critical/high (DS-07) · MDC-03Healthymi-dev-pipeline — Reader on sub-prod-data (assessor)EDR telemetry · last seen 3d agoCAP-3
Unlinked
ServerBusiness criticalPublic endpoint configured1 critical/high (DS-07)ImpairedNot assessedEDR telemetry · last seen 2d agoEXP-1
SQL databaseBusiness criticalReachable (tested)Misconfiguration: MDC-04, MDC-05 (DS-10)Not applicable (PaaS)Vendor SQL login (assessor)Not assessed (DS-19 missing)CAP-2
Unlinked
Endpoint population—UnresolvedNot assessed individuallyMixed — see Endpoint SecurityNot assessedNot assessedXAP-1
ServerTier-0Not internet-facing0 critical/high (DS-07)Unknown — not in exportNot assessedEDR onboarded — telemetry not in the DS-09 exportIAP-3
ServerTier-0Not internet-facing1 critical/high (DS-07)Unknown — not in exportNot assessedEDR onboarded — telemetry not in the DS-09 exportIAP-3
Endpoint + Azure — one record
Azure VM (server)Business criticalReachable (tested)0 critical/high (DS-07)HealthyNot assessedEDR telemetry · last seen 2d agoCAP-5
Unlinked
ServerBusiness criticalNot internet-facing1 critical/high (DS-07)Unknown — not in exportNot assessedEDR onboarded — telemetry not in the DS-09 exportEXP-2
Endpoint population—UnresolvedNot assessed individuallyMixed — see Endpoint SecurityNot assessedNot assessedIAP-3
Key VaultBusiness criticalNot internet-facingNo open findingNot applicable (PaaS)Not assessed — no RBAC exportNot assessed (DS-19 missing)CAP-5
Unlinked
Managed identityNon-productionNot internet-facingMisconfiguration: MDC-14 (DS-10)Not applicable (PaaS)Not assessed — no RBAC exportNot assessed (DS-19 missing)CAP-3
SQL databaseBusiness criticalNot internet-facingNo open findingNot applicable (PaaS)Not assessed — no RBAC exportNot assessed (DS-19 missing)CAP-5
Unlinked
ServerBusiness criticalNot internet-facing2 critical/high (DS-07)Unknown — not in exportNot assessedEDR onboarded — telemetry not in the DS-09 exportEXP-2
Endpoint population—UnresolvedNot assessed individuallyMixed — see Endpoint SecurityNot assessedNot assessedEXP-3
Unlinked
Container registryBusiness criticalPublic endpoint configuredMisconfiguration: MDC-16 (DS-10)Not applicable (PaaS)Not assessed — no RBAC exportNot assessed (DS-19 missing)—
Unlinked

Exposure states are kept separate: known → public endpoint configured → effectively reachable → vulnerable → exploitable → confirmed compromised. “Exploitable” is not assessed for any asset; no compromise is recorded in the incident register.

Identity attack routes

From Identity & Access and Cloud Security — effective privileges are never inferred from role names alone. 23 Azure Owner assignments are assessor-reported. No dedicated Azure RBAC dataset has been ingested or validated.

CombinationPaths and statusWhat is knownEvidence needed to validateRisk
Privileged role exposure
Global Administrator and standing Azure Owner reachable through phishable MFA.Privileged role inventory (DS-05), sign-in logsRL-101
Missing phishing-resistant MFA
CA003 / CA007 accept any MFA method; CA004 is report-only.MFA registration (DS-04), sign-in logsRL-101
Excessive permissions
Delegated mail/file scopes; non-production identity with production Reader.Azure RBAC (proposed DS-39), sign-in logsRL-116
Service principal privileges
Not modelled — no evidenced route
SP-03 and SP-05 are high-privilege (see the table below), but no route to their credentials is evidenced — they are not modelled as paths.App credential usage and sign-in logsUnlinked
Delegation weaknesses
APP-WMS-01 and APP-LEGACY-03 trusted for unconstrained delegation (assessor-reported).Defender for Identity (DS-33), attack-path exportRL-103
Privilege escalation opportunities
Escalation counted only where the relationship is observed or assessor-reported — role names alone are not treated as effective privilege.Effective permissions (DS-39), Defender for IdentityRL-113
Lateral movement
Coerced authentication (assessor) and assumed privileged sessions on legacy hosts.Defender for Identity lateral-movement paths (DS-33)RL-103
High-privilege identities with unverified access paths

Shown as identities only — no attack-path relationship is created until a route to them is evidenced.

IdentityPrivilegeEvidenceAccess pathNeeded to verifyRisk
mi-automation
Managed identity · since 1 Jul
Owner (sub-prod-shared)Named in Defender for Cloud MDC-14 (DS-10); role scope assessor-reportedUnverified — not modelledAzure RBAC (proposed DS-39) and who can edit the automation runbooksRL-113provisional
Automation runbooks (sp-automation-ops)
Service principal · since 22 Oct
Application.ReadWrite.All (app role)App registration credentials (DS-25)Unverified — not modelledCredential usage and service-principal sign-in logs; owner attestationUnlinked
Legacy WMS sync (sp-wms-sync)
Service principal · since 22 Oct
Directory.ReadWrite.All (app role)App registration credentials (DS-25)Unverified — not modelledCredential usage and service-principal sign-in logs; owner attestationRL-103provisional

Endpoint-to-cloud combinations

Candidate scenarios, not confirmed paths — a relationship is shown as observed only where a catalogue dataset supports it

CombinationPaths and statusWhat is knownEvidence needed to validateRisk
Internet-facing workload with a vulnerability and missing EDR
HQ-RDG-01: critical vulnerability with impaired EDR. DEPOT-FTP-02 is internet-facing with no EDR, so its vulnerabilities are unknown — a visibility gap, not a path.Effective network rules (proposed DS-41), external reachability (DS-44)RL-104
Unsupported server with privileged access
RL-109: 17 Windows Server 2012 R2 hosts — 2 covered by ESU, 15 without. Privileged sessions on them are assumed.Privileged role inventory (DS-05), Defender for IdentityRL-109
Compromised workstation as a route to cloud administration
Which of the 1,180 workstations administrators use is unknown — the entry point is unresolved.Privileged workstation inventory (proposed DS-46), sign-in logsRL-113
Managed identity with excessive permissions
mi-dev-pipeline reads production; mi-automation holds Owner but has no evidenced entry point, so it is not modelled as a path.Azure RBAC (proposed DS-39)Unlinked
Endpoint visibility gap affecting path confidence
Not modelled — no evidenced route
RL-104: 31 of 221 servers without EDR at this assessment (49 before 29 Jul, 31 after A-1041). Routes through unprotected servers cannot be observed. EXP-4 (inactive sensors) is a visibility condition, not a path.EDR onboarding of the remaining servers (A-1042, A-1043)RL-104

Historical exposure

Paths present at each assessment by evidence status · reduced exposure is shown separately from reduced visibility

No path is observed in source evidence in any assessment — there is no tool attack-path export. Growth from Aug reflects new paths recorded, not necessarily new exposure.

AssessmentNewly presentNo longer observedVerified remediationEvidence unavailableMissing datasetsServers without EDR
MayIAP-1, IAP-4, CAP-5—CAP-1EXP-2949
JunIAP-3, EXP-2, CAP-2———749
Jul————731
AugEXP-1, CAP-3, CAP-4, XAP-1IAP-4, CAP-5——731
SepEXP-3—IAP-4IAP-2631
OctIAP-2———531

Verified remediation requires a completed register action, recorded dataset completion evidence and an export collected after the change: CAP-1 (A-1051, DS-10 26 May) and IAP-4 (A-1112 on 22 Aug; the same-day DS-03 export cannot show order, so it is verified by the 22 Sep export and shows “no longer observed” in Aug). CAP-5 disappeared from the Aug export without a remediation record, so it is “no longer observed”, not remediated. “Evidence unavailable” marks a visibility gap (e.g. EXP-2 in May before DS-09; IAP-2 in Sep before DS-24) — not reduced exposure. Servers without EDR follow RL-104’s dated history (49 → 31 on 29 Jul).

Management attention

Each item links to its path, remediation record or material risk

Highest-impact credible paths
Critical assets with multiple exposures
Priority choke points
Unverified relationships in critical paths
IAP-11 assumed · 3 assessor-reported · 3 evidence gaps
IAP-30 assumed · 3 assessor-reported · 3 evidence gaps
EXP-23 assumed · 0 assessor-reported · 2 evidence gaps
CAP-41 assumed · 2 assessor-reported · 3 evidence gaps
XAP-12 assumed · 2 assessor-reported · 3 evidence gaps
Decisions required
RL-103Approve a WMS maintenance window for the delegation change (estimated 4 hours of downtime).Priya Shah · by 7 NovRL-109Approve the migration plan and budget for the remaining 15 servers.Priya Shah · by 25 Nov
MRQ-03Materiality decision: Azure SQL reporting database open to all IP addressesTom Whitfield · by 1 Dec · Unlinked
MRQ-05Materiality decision: Internet-exposed SSH on a non-production jump hostTom Whitfield · by 1 Dec · Unlinked
MRQ-06Materiality decision: Unmanaged workstations with potential access to the finance applicationTom Whitfield · no decision date set · Unlinked

RiskLens · Demonstration build · Paths are built from existing synthetic records. “Evidence-backed” refers to simulated evidence, not independent validation.